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Abstract
The paper discusses Raymond Boudon’s theory of ordinary rationality as well as his assess-
ment of the so-called “analytical sociology”. On the first point, the paper argues that, in 
order to combine the realism of an unconstrained conception of rationality with the ex-ante 
facto predictive power of the narrow version of rational choice theory, we should better 
understand the relation between potentially triggering events and the actor’s “reasons”. 
Heuristics, social identity, and emotions are regarded as good candidates to advance in that 
direction. On the second point, the paper recalls some factual elements suggesting that 
Boudon’s assessment of analytical sociology is excessively severe and explains why some 
analytical sociologists are right in devoting especial attention to computational modelling. 
Keywords: rationality; heuristics; social identity; emotions; analytical sociology; agent-
based simulation.
Resumen. Explicaciones basadas en razones y sociología analítica. Una réplica a Boudon
El trabajo discute la teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria de Raymond Boudon, así como 
su valoración de la denominada «sociología analítica». Respecto a la primera cuestión, el 
artículo argumenta que, para combinar el realismo de una concepción de la racionalidad sin 
constreñimientos con el poder predictivo ex-ante facto de la versión estándar de la teoría de 
la elección racional, debemos comprender mejor la relación entre eventos potencialmente 
desencadenantes y las «razones» del actor. Heurísticas, identidad social y emociones son 
vistas como buenas candidatas para avanzar en esa dirección. En lo que se refiere a la segun-
da cuestión, el artículo recuerda algunos elementos factuales, sugiriendo que la valoración 
de Boudon de la sociología analítica es excesivamente severa y explica por qué algunos 
sociólogos analíticos dedican especial atención a los modelos computacionales. 
Palabras clave: racionalidad; heurísticas; identidad social; emociones; sociología analítica; 
simulación multiagente.
* This article was first published in Revue européenne des sciences sociales 2/2012 (50-2), 
p. 36-65. It was a rejoinder to a Raymond Boudon’s paper also published in that issue. 
Re-printed with permission from Librairie Droz.
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Introduction
One of the most important findings in the contemporary philosophy of social 
sciences is that the materially constrained pursuit of single-minded self-interests 
is far from being the only way in which human rationality, hence rational 
action, can be conceived (see Searle, 2001). In social sciences, this fact is well 
reflected by the plurality of forms that, despite its apparently unifying label, 
the theory of rational choice has assumed over the years (Goldthorpe, 1998). 
This heterogeneity expresses a progressive shift from the narrow to the broad 
conceptions of rational action. According to the latter, all kinds of desires and 
constraints are admitted, full information is no longer assumed, and actors’ 
subjectivity in constraint perception is crucial (Opp, 1999). This move away 
from the narrow versions of rational action theory is partly due to the lack of 
empirical support for its core micro-level assumptions – where experimental 
psychology (Shafir and LeBoeuf, 2002) and behavioral economics (Camerer 
and Loewenstein, 2004) played the crucial role – and partly to its explanatory 
failures (Ostrom, 1998).
However, the dichotomous distinction between narrow and broad versions 
of rational action theories tends to hide an important fact: that broad versions 
are not all equally broad. In this regard, the most noticeable change over the 
last two decades has been the diffusion of an extreme variant of broad rational 
choice theory in which actors’ rationality is equated to having subjectively well-
founded “reasons”. Rational action thus basically amounts to “reasoned action” 
(more than to “reasonable action”: on the distinction between “rationality” 
and “reasonableness” see Beaney [2001]).
In economics, this point of view is endorsed by Sen (2009, p. 180), who 
expresses it as follows: “Rationality of choice, in this view, is primarily a matter 
of basing our choices – explicitly or by implication – on reasoning that we can 
reflectively sustain if we subject them to critical scrutiny”. Reason sustainability 
is not only a matter of “self-scrutiny”, Sen (2009, p. 196) adds, but also of 
“defensibility in reasoning with others” – here, Sen (2009, p. 44-46) refers 
back to Smith’s metaphor of the “impartial spectator”. Similar views can be 
found in political philosophy (see Rawls, 2003; Young, 2005; and Pizzorno, 
2007, p. 123).
In sociology, over the last two decades or so, Raymond Boudon has been 
among the scholars who have taken this open conception of rationality as a set 
of well-grounded subjective reasons to its furthest extent (see Boudon 1989, 
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1993, 1996, 1998a, 2003, and 2011). His plea for a “reason with a small r” 
is based on the conviction that every other definition of rationality would be 
insufficient fully to account for the variety of ways in which human behaviour 
can be called “rational” (see Boudon, 1994, ch. 9). Similarly to Sen (2009, p. 
191-193), Boudon’s extreme extension of the concept of rationality is strictly 
related to his intention rationally to explain not only individuals’ choices of 
means but also their choices of ends (see Boudon, 2001).
As I read it, Boudon’s “‘Analytical sociology’ and the explanation of beliefs” 
(see, in this issue, p. 7-34) is the most remarkable synthesis of his theory of 
rational action. To the best of my knowledge, this paper also contains his first 
explicit assessment of an approach to sociological theory that, over the last ten 
years or so, has received considerable attention around the world, i.e. so-called 
“analytical sociology”.
I have two purposes in what follows. First, I intend to discuss what seems 
to me the crucial difficulty with a conception of rational action that equates 
“rationality” with “reasons”. On this view, indeed, one can no longer benefit 
from the “predictive device” (Sen, 2009, p. 175, p. 183) contained in the nar-
rower conception that frames rationality in terms of instrumental rationality. 
The line of reasoning that I shall seek to defend is that, in order to combine 
the realism of an unconstrained conception of rationality with the deductive 
power of the narrow version of rational choice theory, a possible solution is to 
look for regularities in the relation between potentially triggering events and 
the actor’s “reasons”. In particular, I shall consider heuristics, social identity, 
and emotions as explanatory factors which should be more systematically ana-
lysed to find such regularities. I regard this line of reasoning as one possible 
starting point, but not as the full answer, which would be beyond the scope of 
this paper. My second goal is even more modest. I intend only to recall some 
factual elements suggesting that Boudon’s assessment of analytical sociology is 
excessively severe. In particular, I shall explain why computational modeling, 
to which analytical sociologists devote especial attention, is a central resource 
with which to test theoretical explanations referring to complex systems of 
individuals’ reasons.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the main difficulty with 
an unconstrained conception of rationality à la Boudon; second, I analyze this 
conception of rational action in the light of important contributions on “heuris-
tics”, on “social identity, and on “emotions” in psychology, in economics, and in 
political science. Finally, I discuss Boudon’s assessment of analytical sociology.
1. What We Can (not) Do with Boudon’s Theory of Ordinary Rationality
“‘Analytical sociology’ and the explanation of beliefs” (see p. 7-34, in this issue) 
contains a clear exposition of what Boudon now calls a “theory of ordinary 
rationality” (Boudon [1989] first adopted the label of “subjective rationality”, 
and then that of “cognitive rationality”: see, for instance, Boudon, 1996). The 
theory relies on the “cognitive equilibrium principle” according to which one 
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must examine actors’ reasons to find the proximate causes of their choices – in 
Boudon’s words, “people believe that X is true, acceptable, good, legitimate, 
etc. as soon as they have the feeling that X rests upon a set of acceptable 
reasons” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 18 – note the similarity between this 
statement and Sen’s definition of rational action quoted in the introduction).
Thus, the distinctiveness of Boudon’s theory of rational action is that actors’ 
reasons are completely unrestricted in the sense that no specific class of reasons 
is given explanatory priority. The rhetoric of cost-benefit calculation disappears 
behind the variety of arguments that actors can endorse and publicly defend 
to sustain the beliefs that motivate them to act. In the paper under discussion, 
Boudon demonstrates that this open conception of actors’ rationality makes it 
possible to explain much more social regularity than allowed by the narrow ver-
sion of the rational choice theory. In particular, he argues, by extending the set 
of acceptable reasons, it is possible to explain not only the choice of means but 
also the choice of ends. In this way, sociology can explain the genesis of complex 
sets of human values like individuals’ feelings of justice (on this point, see, in 
particular, Boudon and Betton, 1999).
This achievement comes with a cost, however. To restrict actors’ motiva-
tions to a specific class of reasons – instrumental reasons, in the case of the 
narrow variants of the rational choice theory – makes it possible to form expec-
tations on the micro-behaviours and their macroscopic consequences that are 
most likely to appear, given a certain set of constraints. A given empirical obser-
vation can thus be compared with a clear benchmark that is formulated before 
the observation is made. As acknowledged by Sen (2009, p. 175 and p. 183), 
who, as we have seen, endorses a very open conception of rational action, the 
capacity to figure out a single outcome ex-ante facto is lost when actors’ 
rationality is given a completely unconstrained form. On this view, the expres-
sion “rational action theory” itself is inappropriate. Strictly speaking, indeed, 
there is no theory, but rather a single framework in which every sort of reason-
based explanation – i.e. an explanation focusing on the system of arguments that 
a given set of actors endorse to act in the way that they act – can be conceived.
The loss of the “predictive device”, to use Sen’s expression, affecting the 
conception of human rationality as a complex set of subjectively well-grounded 
reasons should be carefully distinguished from two related but analytically dis-
tinct objections usually brought against the broad versions of rational choice 
theory: namely their lack of deductive power, and the danger of adhocness to 
which they are exposed.
As correctly pointed out by Boudon (1998b, p. 195) himself, the deduc-
tive power of a theory involving individuals’ reasons does not depend “on the 
nature of reasons mobilized in a model”. Given a set of postulated “reasons”, 
in fact, it is possible to form expectations on what behaviour is likely to appear. 
As no explanatory primacy is given to a specific set of “reasons”, however, the 
deductive power only exists once the set of reasons have been postulated. But 
how could one achieve such a system of reasons? This question leads directly 
to the adhocness objection that an unrestricted conception of human rational-
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ity increases the probability that the set of hypothesized reasons will continue 
to be re-adjusted until it is possible to demonstrate that a given macroscopic 
regularity in fact derives from a population of actors acting in a rational way 
(Pizzorno, 2007, p. 65-66). As discussed at length by Opp (1999), however, 
this danger can be powerfully counteracted by the use of empirical data to 
assess the extent to which the hypothesized set of reasons is tenable. More spe-
cifically, the empirical solution says that, given a certain individual behaviour 
and a set of macroscopic consequences, once the set of individual reasons leading 
to this behaviour has been formulated, one must test whether the reasons pos-
tulated are empirically tenable. If not, one should revise the protocol of data 
collection and / or modify the set of hypothesized reasons.
The “empirical argument” thus amounts to an iterative procedure of post 
hoc theory testing which tends to be case-oriented. It only suggests that theo-
ries built on a very open conception of rational action can be falsified, but it 
does not help to remedy the problem of the reduced predictive power of these 
theories. In other words, Opp’s empirical approach does not solve the problem 
of the variety of predictions than can be made on the basis of a conception of 
rational action that equates “rationality” and “reasonableness” – a problem that 
Boudon himself has acknowledged elsewhere (1998b, p. 195)1.
Would it be possible to go beyond the empirical approach? In particular, is 
there any way to combine an open conception of rationality with the predictive 
power of the narrow versions of the rational choice theory? My answer is that 
we may eventually achieve this result by identifying some mechanisms that tend 
systematically to trigger certain set of reasons. In this case, we would have access 
to a set of regularities that enable us to formulate ex-ante facto clear expectations 
on what micro- and macro-level outcomes are more likely to be observed2.
2. Three Classes Of “Reason Triggers”
I propose to define a “reason trigger” as a structural or individual-level fac-
tor that increases the probability that a specific set of reasons will arise in the 
1. Boudon’s reply is that “the reconstruction of reasons is a theory and that, as soon as the 
elements of a theory are acceptable, because they consist of empirical data and acceptable 
laws, the challenge is to find another theory that would be better in some respect […] If you 
do not like the latter, the challenge is this: find a better theory. We can never prove that a 
theory is true, only that one theory is better than another” (personal communication from 
Boudon’s after he had read a first draft of the present paper). But this does not help solve the 
problem. Like Opp’s empirical argument, this one only suggests that reason-based theories 
can be falsified. It does not address the issue of their capacity to point out ex-ante facto what 
system of reasons is likely to appear under certain circumstances, which is what one needs to pro-
duce ex-ante facto testable propositions.
2. The “empirical approach” can, of course, contribute to this result. In the long run, indeed, if 
it is applied systematically, one of its by-products may be the discovery of regularities in the 
connection between certain incentive structures and specific sets of actors’ reasons. These 
regularities may then be incorporated into reason-based theories à la Boudon, thereby 
increasing their predictive capacity.
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actor’s mind. I focus here on three broad class of reason triggers that may help 
in finding regularity in the individuals’ belief formation process, namely (i) 
“cognitive and social heuristics”; (ii) human invariants; (iii) “emotions”. For 
each of these factors, I will also suggest that, while Boudon has never explicitly 
analyzed them in depth, none of them is in contradiction with his analysis of 
how reasons form in actors’ minds.
2.1. Reason-based explanations and “heuristics”
Building on Simon’s concepts of “bounded rationality” and of “heuristic 
search” (see, respectively, Simon, 1979; and Newell et. al. 1958), a large body 
of psychological literature has developed on “heuristics”, i.e. cognitive shortcuts 
adopted by actors when they have to decide and solve problems (see Goldstein, 
2009). In economics, this concept was used by Kahneman and Tversky to 
demonstrate that actors’ reasoning is variously “biased” and that it does not 
conform with the way in which the narrow version of rational choice theory 
frames human decision-making (for an overview see Kahneman, 2003).
Readers who are familiar with Boudon’s work may be surprised by my 
reference to this literature. In effect, Boudon has repeatedly criticized Kah-
neman and Tversky for treating “cognitive biases” as black boxes (see, for 
instance, Boudon, 1998b, p.180; 2004, p.186). Whilst one may agree that 
many of the “frames”, “scripts”, or “biases” mobilized in cognitive psychology 
and in economics are nothing more than labels – which is sometimes admitted 
even in the behavioral economics (see, for instance, Frederick et al., 2002, on 
the concept of “inter-temporal discount rate”) – the so-called “fast-and-frugal 
heuristic” research program (Gigerenzer, 2008) studies “heuristics” in a far less 
black-box fashion and explicitly aims to go beyond the concept of “cognitive 
biases” as conceived by Kahneman and Tversky.
Whilst, to the best of my knowledge, Boudon and Gigerenzer do not cite 
each other, their conceptions of human rationality are in fact strikingly similar. 
First of all, Gigerenzer (2008, p. 7) makes exactly the same criticism as Boudon 
of Kahneman’s “heuristic-and-biases program”. He maintains that “heuristics” 
are not directly and explicitly modeled in this research tradition, so that they 
end up with “mere verbal labels”. Moreover, like Boudon, Gigerenzer argues 
that Kahneman and Tversky in fact adhere to the standard rational choice 
approach because they still assume that actors’ rationality should comply with 
logic- and probability-based rules. According to Gigerenzer, it is instead the 
structure of the information contained in the environment in which actors are 
embedded that generates what is rational for them. He calls this conception 
of rationality “ecological rationality” (in economics, see Smith, 2008, p. 36, 
p. 151 and p. 168).
This largely overlaps with Boudon’s frame of rational action as “reason- 
grounded action”. In the paper under discussion, for instance, Boudon states 
that, in order to understand actors’ reasons, “the observer should be aware of 
the relevant features of the social and cognitive context in which the individual 
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is embedded.” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 16). Thus, according to him, 
magical rituals should be interpreted as perfectly rational from the point of 
view of those individuals who are ignorant of biological, chemical and physical 
mechanisms that are instead known by many contemporary observers. In the 
two cases, the structure of the information is simply different.
Given the strong similarity between Boudon’s “ordinary rationality” and 
Gigerenzer’s “ecological rationality”, what should we expect to gain from a 
more systematic integration between the two theoretical perspectives? My argu-
ment is that the experimental evidence accumulated within the “fast-and-frugal 
heuristic” (for an overview see Gigerenzer et al., 2011) provides useful empiri-
cal material with which to find regularities between the environment in which 
actors are embedded and the system of reasons that they tend to develop. 
We may discover, for instance, that, when information is highly skewed so 
that certain outcomes are rare, actors have good reasons to believe that they 
perform (or can avoid risk) better than they do in reality. Systematic links of 
this kind among given informational structures, beliefs, and certain mental 
shortcuts may help in building reason-based explanations that do not rely on 
a posteriori operations of reason reconstruction, thereby helping us to specify 
in advance the micro-level behaviour and its macroscopic consequences that 
are most likely to be observed.
2.2. Reason-based explanations and “social identity”
The second class of reason triggers that might be fruitfully incorporated into 
reason-based explanations are “human invariants”, i.e., as I conceive them 
here, behavioral, cognitive or emotional patterns common to all human beings 
regardless of the culture in which they live.
At first sight, similarly to the concepts of “heuristics” and biases”, that of 
“human invariant” may seem incompatible with Boudon’s theoretical frame-
work. In effect, the French sociologist has never concealed his distaste for 
“dispositional variables”, which, in the paper under discussion, he defines as 
“conjectural causes operating in the backs of [the actors’] mind” (“‘Analyti-
cal sociology’...”, p. 17). On the other hand, however, in his final comment 
on Durkheim’s analysis of magical rituals, he judges Durkheim’s explanation 
convincing because it introduces “either empirical statements [...] or psycho-
logical uncontroversial laws, as ‘in general people want to survive’” (ibid., 
p. 22). Boudon is thus implicitly admitting that “dispositional variables” are 
legitimate explanatory factors as long as we can demonstrate that these dispo-
sitions correspond to well-defined basic individual needs or desires (see also 
Elster, 2011, p. 61).
This is an extremely important point because it opens rational action the-
ory in sociology to research in anthropology (see, for instance, Brown, 1991, 
1999, 2004), in evolutionary psychology (see Pinker, 2002) and, partly, in 
behavioral economics (see, for instance, Henrich et al., 2001; Gächter and 
Herrmann, 2009) intended to establish the existence of individual invariants 
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empirically. This literature can be of benefit to sociologists defending a con-
ception of human rationality which equates rationality and “reason-grounded 
action” in that it can provide insights on universal psychological motivations 
that tend regularly to activate specific set of reasons.
Among basic individual needs, an individual’s desire to possess and to 
defend a well-defined social identity seems especially important for sociologi-
cal analysis. In social psychology, it is commonplace to consider the need for 
social belonging as a fundamental motivation (see, for instance, Fiske, 2011, 
p. 116). Pizzorno’s and Akerlof’s conceptualizations of social identity are two 
interesting starting points from which to assess the fruitfulness of a closer 
integration between reason-based explanation à la Boudon and identity-based 
explanations. In effect, Pizzorno overtly builds his theoretical proposal against 
the theory of rational choice and methodological individualism, whereas Aker-
lof aims to extend the standard model of the actor in mainstream economics3.
Pizzorno’s (1986, p. 366-372) thesis is that social action can be framed in 
terms of rational action provided we accept that rationality needs identity. He 
explains the source of this link as follows. When an actor is choosing between, 
say, X and Y, at time t, according to rational action theory, he should be able 
to evaluate the expected benefits of the two alternatives at time t+n. However, 
Pizzorno argues, in order for this evaluation to be possible, the actor’s identity 
should be stable over time. If not, the expected future benefits of X and of Y can-
not be really evaluated and compared because the actor does not know what his 
point of view on X and on Y will be at time t+n. Thus, without inter-temporal 
identity stability, he argues, rational action is impossible. Pizzorno’s proposal is 
that social recognition, hence the social circles that provide it, should be consid-
ered as identity “stabilizers”. That is why the actor’s logic, according to Pizzorno, 
is driven more by the quest for sources of social recognition than by self-interest 
(see Aguiar and de Francisco [2002] for a criticism of Pizzorno’s argument).
Pizzorno’s and Boudon’s analytical framework are less distant that might 
seem. In the paper under discussion, Boudon states that actors can believe that 
the reasons that they endorse to act in the way that they act are strong only if 
they also believe that these reasons can in principle be shared by other actors. 
This is the concept of reason trans-subjectivity (see “‘Analytical sociology’...”, 
3. Within the micro-foundationist tradition, Little (1998, ch. 6) has argued that there is no 
incompatibility in principle between identity- and reason-based theories. Broad rational- 
choice theorists have explicitly attempted to incorporate identity into the rational-choice 
framework. Some have done so by introducing the idea that actors are animated by a mul- 
tiplicity of selves, the objective of this hypothesis being to account for some violations of the 
predictions that would ensue from the standard rational-theory, like the so-called weakness 
of will phenomenon (see, for instance, Elster, 1985, and Coleman, 1990, ch. 19). Others have 
tried to incorporate identity-based preferences into rational choice theory by conceiving 
“social identity” as a complex set of beliefs about oneself and about the group to which one 
thinks/wants to belong (see Aguiar and Francisco, 2009). Here my point of view is different, 
in that, on the one hand, I am not mobilizing social identity to remedy some explanatory 
failures of the narrow version of the rational choice theory, and, on the other hand, I consider 
the desire-component of social identity more than its belief-component.
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p. 18). Pizzorno’s idea of “recognition circles” implies a similar notion: the 
actor needs others with similar views in order to be reassured about his iden-
tity, which is what makes belief and reason formation possible. In both cases, 
it is postulated that actors need to search for potential sources of (more or less) 
local social consensus.
A similar concern for social conformism is behind Akerlof’s endeavour to 
devise a new approach in economics called “identity economics” (see Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2001). The basic assumption here is that beliefs about oneself 
(identity), beliefs about expected behaviors (normative beliefs, in Boudon’s 
terminology) as a function of this identity, and choices are closely interrelated. 
On this basis, Akerlof and Kranton build an analytical framework that can 
be summarized as follows: a) actors belong to social categories; b) social cat-
egories convey beliefs about the self (actors’ identity); c) social categories are 
also associated with norms about the prevailing behavior within the category; 
d) actors’ utility increases/decreases if they conform with / violate these norms 
(ibid., p. 14 and chap. 3). Conformism assures social belonging (ibid., p. 22).
Despite the different pathways that Pizzorno and Akerlof follow to plead 
for an integration of identity concerns into rational action theory, both of them 
establishes a link among social belonging, social identity and actors’ beliefs. 
Again, my argument is that this link can help in building reason-based explana-
tions that lead to fine-grained predictions ex-ante facto. For instance, when actors 
are deeply concerned to secure their social identity, one may expect that, in order 
to reinforce their participation in a social group, they will be more likely to accept 
material and psychological costs so that collective action (see Willer, 2009) or 
even extreme choices like terrorist attacks (see Tosini, 2011) become possible.
When such concerns for social identity and status drive actor’s behaviour, 
we can also expect them to express different convictions in different social 
circles, to change their minds as the networks to which they belong change, or 
publicly to express opinions that they do not endorse in private – the so-called 
“unpopular norms” (see Bicchieri, 2006, ch. 5; Centola, Willer, and Macy, 
2005; Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy, 2009). Within this analytical framework 
that conceives the need for social identity as a fundamental human motiva-
tion, preference inconsistency can thus be anticipated and explained without 
introducing dubious hypotheses like that of a fragmentation of the actor’s self.
2.3. Reason-based explanations and “emotions”
Emotions are the last reason trigger that I shall briefly discuss as a basic micro-
level element that might help to increase the predictive power of theories based 
on a conception of rational action as “reason-grounded action”4.
4.  Stets and Turner (2006) provide a thorough overview of the variety of theoretical perspec- 
tives on emotions in sociology. By contrast, the empirical description of emotions is only in 
its early stages in sociology. As remarked by Golder and Macy (2011), large-scale web-based 
data might help improve this situation.
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In the paper under discussion, Boudon does not address the place of emo-
tions in the explanation of social action. Elsewhere, however, he explicitly 
admits that actors’ emotions and actors’ reasons are closely related, with the 
causality going in both directions, i.e. from actors’ beliefs to actors’ emotions 
and the reverse (see, for instance, Boudon, 2003b, p. 150-151).
This is important because, as pointed out by Frijda et al. (2000), much 
research has been conducted to understand how emotions are triggered by the 
way in which actors perceive external events (see, for instance, Scherer, 2011). 
By contrast, “oddly”, say Frijda et al. (2000, p. 1), the causal direction going 
from actors’ emotions to actors’ beliefs “has received scant attention”. When 
this is the case, they remark, “the emphasis has been on the assumption that 
the former [emotions] distort the latter [beliefs]” (ibid., p. 2).
Elster is a good example of this asymmetry within the philosophy of social 
science and sociology. He has focused closely on the effect that actors’ cog-
nitions (or perceptions) have on actors’ emotions (for a recent overview see 
Elster, 2011). In particular, he has carefully studied, for each emotion, the 
action tendency that this emotion is likely to trigger once it has been activated 
by a given belief. As regards the causal link from emotion to beliefs, how-
ever, Elster’s (2009) analysis only focuses on the negative consequences that 
emotions can have on beliefs by triggering under-investment in information 
(urgency) or under-estimation of the long-term consequences of action (impa-
tience). The results are, respectively, low-quality and biased beliefs.
To deepen our understanding of emotions as “reason triggers”, the 
“positive” role that emotion plays in belief formation should be analyzed 
more systematically. That actors’ emotions do not necessarily distort cogni-
tions is stressed by Scherer, for instance, who suggests that emotions can be 
rational in the sense that they can help actors to reach their goals (functional 
rationality), to make correct inferences (intellectual rationality), and to be 
accepted by others as persons that react in the right way (reasonable or con-
sensual rationality). An extreme empirical example of the not-necessarily-
biasing effect of actors’ emotions on their beliefs is that of depressive people, 
who tend to assess the reality more realistically than optimistic persons (see 
Scherer, 2011, p. 340). Similarly, it is often observed that fear or anxiety 
may induce actors to invest in information search in order to clarify their 
perception of what political parties offer, thereby acquiring beliefs more 
accurate than would be possible in the absence of such emotions (see, Jas-
pers, 2011)5.
Among the variety of emotions that can act as “reason triggers”, I regard 
interaction-comparison-based emotions as especially important. These are 
emotions, like envy, jealousy, indignation, humiliation, shame or resentment, 
5. The emotion-to-cognition and the cognition-to-emotion patterns can co-exist. The simplest 
example is a dissonance-reduction-based mechanism of belief change where two (or more) 
beliefs that are discrepant generate negative feelings which induce the actor to change one 
(or more) of his initial beliefs (see, for instance, Harmon-Jones, 2000).
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that tend to be triggered by the comparisons that actors make within the 
dyadic interactions in which they are embedded. Social networks are a funda-
mental part of social life, and actors perform every sort of social comparison 
within these networks. Interaction-comparison-based emotions are thus likely 
to be ubiquitous, and they may lie at the origin of many of the beliefs that 
populate actors’ minds6.
Recent research in social psychology suggests that this is a fruitful idea. Fiske 
(2011) builds on an impressive amount of empirical studies to demonstrate that 
social comparisons tend to generate specific emotions that in turn tend to gener-
ate specific beliefs. In particular, she shows that two basic patterns are especially 
frequent. On the one hand, downward comparisons tend to trigger disgust and 
scorn, emotions that tend to induce actors to believe that people below them 
are less warm, less familiar, less competent, less articulate, less intelligent, and, 
in short, less typically human. On the other hand, upward comparisons tend 
to trigger envy and resentment, emotions that tend to induce actors to believe 
that people above them forgo their humanity to get ahead, that they are cold 
and calculating, even though they are competent. Coldness and competence 
tend to trigger the belief that wealthy people are engaged in a conspiracy and, 
ultimately, a threat to “us”.
This is precisely the kind of evidence that we need to increase the predic-
tive capacity of an approach equating rational action with “reason-grounded 
action”. If we know that upward social comparison, for instance, tends to 
trigger specific emotions (like envy) with specific objects (like wealthy people), 
then we may expect to find that specific sets of reasons are also triggered in 
actors’ minds. Members of lower and middle social groups may be more likely 
to think that the members of upper groups do not deserve what they have 
and / or that they have obtained what they have by unfair or corrupt means. 
As a consequence, they may also be more likely to believe that the economic 
organization that supports those groups should be changed. A reason-based 
theory incorporating such emotion-belief linkages might thus be better able to 
predict ex-ante facto single outcomes at macroscopic level, like waves of anti- or 
pro-capitalist attitudes (see Jaspers 2011, for a plea for emotions to be included 
in the analysis of social movements).
2.4. The argument in a nutshell and Boudon’s expected reply
The argument that I have outlined so far is that an extremely open rational 
action theory conceiving actors’ rationality as a bundle of subjectively well-
founded reasons can profit from stronger connections with three research areas: 
6. Elster (1999, p. 141-142; 2007, p. 58) distinguishes between comparison-based emotions, 
like envy, and interaction-based emotions like resentment. In order to draw attention to 
the fact that these emotions are often a by-product of the social comparisons driven by dyadic 
links between actors, I propose the hybrid conceptual category of “comparison- interac-
tion-based emotions”.
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1) the “new” literature in cognitive psychology about mental and social short-
cuts, i.e. “heuristics”; 2) the literature in anthropology and in evolutionary 
psychology about basic and culturally invariant psychological needs; 3) the 
literature in cognitive psychology on emotions.
When “heuristics”, “social identity”, and “emotions” are considered as 
“reason triggers”, the benefit that one may expect from integrating them into 
a reason-based theoretical perspective in which actors’ rationality is uncon-
strained concerns the increase in the predictive capacity of this perspective. 
The more we know about the regular linkages between the structures of 
information in which the actors are embedded and their beliefs, among 
actors’ networks, their social identities and their beliefs, and between actors’ 
emotions and actors’ beliefs, the more, it seems to me, we should be able to 
figure out a priori the micro- and macro-level outcomes observable under 
given social circumstances. In this way, we may eventually combine the realism 
of an open conception of rational action with the “predictive device”, to use 
Sen’s expression, contained in the narrower versions of the rational choice 
theory.
Boudon’s reaction to the line of reasoning proposed would probably be 
that integrating cognitive-, identity-, and emotion-based mechanisms into a 
subjective conception of human rationality would expose sociologists to the 
risk of paying attention to unnecessary psychological details. Over the years, 
indeed, he has consistently defended the thesis that sociology should be based 
on a “conventional psychology”, that is to say, a highly abstract depiction 
of how actors think and feel (see, for instance, Boudon, 2003c, p. 169-170; 
2007, p. 44, footnote 1). Within the micro-foundationist tradition, among 
others, Coleman (1990, ch. 1) and Goldthorpe (1998, p. 181-182) have also 
made a strong case against the introduction of an elaborate individual psy-
chology into an appropriate rational action theory for sociology. Their argu-
ment is that we do not need to go into much detail about actors’ psychology 
because the explanatory focus of sociology is the macroscopic consequences 
of individuals’ actions. The implicit assumption behind this argument is that, 
where large populations of actors are concerned, psychological differences 
across actors cancel each other out, so that we are entitled to focus only on 
ideal-typical actors.
In my view, the analysis of “heuristics”, “social identity”, and “emotions” 
as “reason triggers” does not necessarily lead to a psychological-based theory 
of social action. My proposal certainly presupposes a stronger interaction with 
social and cognitive psychology; but what one should look for in this literature 
is a set of regularities between specific individual-level factors and the genesis 
of certain set of reasons, rather than details about actors’ personalities and 
idiosyncrasies. That said, on a methodological level, we today have access to 
techniques that enable study of the macroscopic consequences of models of 
actors as complex as we want, so that we have fewer good reasons than in the 
past for omitting too many details at the micro-level. This is a point that I 
address in the next section.
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3. Boudon and Analytical Sociology
As announced in the introduction, apart from arguing for a general theory of 
rational action, “‘Analytical sociology’ and the explanation of beliefs” contains 
Boudon’s first explicit assessment of the so-called “analytical sociology”. Here 
it is:
I have the impression, though, that the handbooks on “analytical sociology” 
insist on secondary technical details and fail to identify clearly the common 
paradigm that underlies many illuminating sociological works, i.e. the para-
digm that I have tried to identify as grounded on three principles: methodo-
logical singularism, methodological individualism and the cognitive equilibrium 
principle (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 31).
Analytical sociology is a complex intellectual movement with respect to 
both its distant and proximate historical roots and its position within contem-
porary sociology. In other words, the diachronic and the synchronic frontiers 
of analytical sociology are still not well-defined (see Manzo, 2010). Since Bou-
don explicitly limits his objection to the “handbooks of analytical sociology”, I 
shall restrict myself to programmatic books on analytical sociology in assessing 
this objection (namely, Hedström, 2005, and Hedström and Bearman, 2009a).
To this end it is important to give more precise definition to what analytical 
sociology is. Hedström and Bearman’s (2009b, p. 16) propose the following:
The explanatory strategy can be described as follows (see also Epstein, 
2006): 1. We start with a clearly delineated social fact that is to be explained; 
2. We formulate different hypotheses about relevant micro-level mechanisms; 
3. We translate the theoretical hypotheses into computational models; 4. We 
simulate the models to derive the type of social facts that each micro-level 
mechanism brings about; 5. We compare the social facts generated by each 
model with the actually observed outcomes.
Although restrictive – more qualitative-oriented, yet analytically rigorous, 
scholars would consider steps 3 and 4 unnecessary (see, for instance, Elster, 
2007, p. 455) – this definition is useful for discussing the two main points 
addressed by Boudon’s critical assessment of analytical sociology: the exces-
sive importance attributed by analytical sociologists to techniques, and their 
myopia with respect to the most important principles that animate all scientific 
sociological works.
3.1. Are analytical sociologists really myopic?
Let me start with the second point. Although Hedström and Bearman do not 
use the term “methodological singularism”, it seems to me that their step 1 
clearly follows this principle. In effect, Hedström and Bearman’s advice here 
is to focus on explananda whose temporal and spatial contours are clearly 
specified.
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Boudon’s second principle, i.e. “methodological individualism”, seems to 
me outlined in Hedström and Bearman’s step 2, i.e. “we formulate different 
hypotheses about relevant micro-level mechanisms.” Even more explicitly, 
they claim: “[...] all social facts, their structure and change, are in principle 
explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to 
one another” (Hedström and Bearman, 2009b, p. 8). Moreover, similarly to 
Boudon, Hedström and Bearman (idem) also attempt to avoid the reductionist 
interpretation of this principle by remarking that “As we define the term, struc-
tural individualism is a methodological doctrine [that] differs from traditional 
notions of methodological individualism (e.g. Elster, 1982) by emphasizing the 
explanatory importance of relations and relational structures”.
Boudon’s last principle, i.e. the “cognitive equilibrium principle”, which 
basically states that human actions must be conceived as reason- based, also 
seems to be at the core of analytical sociology. In its manifesto, Hedström 
(2005, p. 38-39) posits: “the desires, beliefs and opportunities of an actor 
are here seen as the proximate causes of the actor’s action and, he continues, 
“beliefs and desires are mental events that can be said to cause an action in 
the sense of providing reasons for the action”. As I stressed earlier, Boudon’s 
fundamental contribution is to demonstrate that there is no compelling justi-
fication for restricting actors’ reasons to instrumental ones. Contrary to what 
some critics of analytical sociology maintain (see Gross, 2009), a similar open 
conception of rationality as “reason-based actions” is also at the heart of ana-
lytical sociology – “DBO theory makes no assumption that actors act rationally, 
however; it only assumes that they act reasonably and with intention”, states 
Hedström (2005, p. 61, emphasis added).
Thus, the analytical sociology manifestos suggest that the three methodological 
principles which Boudon recognizes in every scientific sociological analysis do 
not animate this perspective “implicitly”, as he claims. On the contrary, they 
are explicitly, consciously and programmatically put at the core of the approach 
– could it be otherwise, one may ask, given that Boudon is one of the main 
inspiring intellectual sources of the analytical sociology movement (see Hed-
ström, 2005, p. 6-9)7?
I would expect Boudon’s counter-objection to be that, if analytical sociol-
ogy consists explicitly in the three-rule paradigm that he has identified, then he 
is fully entitled to claim that “although ‘analytical sociology’ is a new expres-
sion, it is actually old wine in new bottles, since it essentially revitalizes the 
principles more or less implicitly used by classical sociologists, notably by 
Weber and Durkheim” (“‘Analytical sociology’…”, p. 19).
7. In this respect, the following coincidence is also significant. In the paper under discussion, 
Boudon cites a recent article by Pawson who, according to Boudon, has “convincing-
ly shown that the paradigm described by those three principles disentangle the meaning of 
“middle range theory” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 29). The second chapter of The Oxford 
Handbook of Analytical Sociology argues that “the theories found in this book are contem-
porary incarnations of Robert K. Merton’s notion of middle-range theory” (see Hedström 
and Udhen, 2009, p. 25).
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That mechanism-based theorizing is at the core of classical sociology is 
a well-established historical fact (see, for instance, Cherkaoui, 2005, ch. 1 
and 4). It is clearly evident to, and explicitly acknowledged by, analytical 
sociologists (see Hedström, 2005, p. 6; Hedström and Edling, 2009). It 
is also clear that contemporary analytical sociology can be traced back to 
research in mathematical sociology, in sociological theory, and in philosophy 
of social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s (see Manzo, 2010). Moreover, it 
would also be easy to demonstrate that specific pieces of analytical sociology 
are at the heart of several strands of the theoretical and empirical literature 
in contemporary sociology. But does this suffice to deny the novelty of 
analytical sociology? I have argued elsewhere that the novelty of analytical 
sociology consists in its integration of epistemological, theoretical, and meth-
odological proposals that only exist separately in the rest of the discipline 
(see Manzo, 2011).
An example of this federative power of analytical sociology is the theory 
of action that it tries to set up. Its most distinctive feature is its attempt to 
endogenize the proximate causes of individuals’ action, i.e. desires, beliefs, and 
opportunities, by taking social interactions into account (see Hedström, 2005, 
p. 42-59). Theoretically, this has a notable consequence: social interactions 
open the theory of action to ego- and alter- centered mechanisms that are usu-
ally not linked to reason-based explanations within the micro-foundationist 
tradition.
Social interactions may induce actors to imitate each other, imitation being 
a heuristic-based mechanism responsible for belief and desire changes (see 
Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 31). The theory of action is thus open to the literature 
on heuristics that I mentioned earlier (see Goldstein, 2009). Social interac-
tions also trigger social comparisons which tend in turn to activate specific 
emotions. The theory of action is thus open to the literature on emotions. We 
saw earlier that individual and social identity is strongly related to comparison 
processes that take place within dyadic interactions. Social interactions thus 
indirectly open the analysis of belief and desire formation and change to theo-
retical models of action that stress identity and social recognition more than 
individual reasons, such as Pizzorno’s framework or the recent developments 
in economics to which I referred earlier. Finally, taking interactions seriously 
into account to explain the genesis of beliefs, desires and opportunities makes 
it possible to establish theoretical and methodological bridges between action 
and network theory – something that, in the paper under discussion here, 
Boudon himself considers a desirable development.
One may retort that this ambition of analytical sociology to integrate 
different strands of the literature in order to develop a more realistic theory 
of action is excessive because sociology does not have methodological tools 
with which to study the macroscopic consequences of complex sets of micro-
level mechanisms. As steps 3 and 4 of Hedström and Bearman’s research 
strategy show, many analytical sociologists think that simulation is a promis-
ing solution.
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3.2. Do analytical sociologists have good reasons to be technique-addicted?
This brings me to the second component of Boudon’s caustic comment on 
analytical sociology, i.e. “that the handbooks on ‘analytical sociology’ insist 
on secondary technical details”. My final remarks aim to explain why a spe-
cific type of simulation method, namely agent-based modeling, can in fact be 
regarded as a crucial resource with which to move sociology towards being 
a deeper and more rigorous discipline (I note in passing that Boudon was a 
strong advocate of formal modeling and simulation in the early stages of his 
intellectual career: see, for instance, Boudon, 1965, 1979).
What are agent-based models? The British computer scientist Michael 
Wooldridge (2009, p. 5) defines an agent as “a computer system that is capable 
of independent action on behalf of its user or owner”. A single agent is thus 
nothing more than a computational entity. “A multiagent system”, Wooldridge 
continues, “is one that consists of a number of agents, which interact with one 
another, typically by exchanging messages through some computer network 
infrastructure”.
This class of formal models is so important for social sciences because it is 
infinitely flexible. Virtually any substantive mechanisms can be represented and 
studied within the framework of agent-based modelling. At the deepest level, 
this flexibility relies on the specific type of programming language adopted to 
build this model, namely the so-called “object-oriented programming” which 
allows specification of each computational entity as a set of attributes and rules 
and their arrangement into different relational topologies and across several 
levels of organization (see Hummon and Fararo, 1995).
This flexibility is especially attractive for sociologists for the following rea-
sons. First, agent-based modeling can represent entities and have them interact 
at any level of analysis. A computational agent need not necessarily represent an 
individual. Whatever entity we wish to represent can be programmed. Accord-
ing to the attributes and the activities associated with the entities, agents can 
represent cells, atoms, molecules, individuals, organizations, groups, nations, 
and so forth.
Second, agent-based modeling makes it possible to introduce as much 
heterogeneity as believed necessary for the problem at hand. Agents can be 
heterogeneous in terms of attributes and/or in terms of the values they get 
on these attributes. More radically, agents can be heterogeneous in terms of 
activities, tasks, or the behavior rules by which they are driven. This is a fun-
damental point. As Gallegati and Kirman (1999) pointed out in their critique 
of mainstream economics, agent-based modeling constitutes a robust formal 
tool that indeed enables us to go beyond the metaphor of the “representative 
agent”. In the paper under discussion, Boudon constantly refers to ideal-typical 
actors. In reality, actors are heterogeneous in terms of beliefs and desires, and 
heterogeneity matters in explaining macroscopic outcomes because heterogeneity 
spreads across social networks. Agent-based modeling allows us to represent 
heterogeneity and study its macroscopic effects.
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Third, agent-based modeling is entirely agnostic about the logic of action 
by which agents are driven. This means that we are no longer obliged to 
represent actors who maximize or optimize some quantity; nor are we obliged 
to suppose that actors possess the very large amount of information needed to 
compute the future consequences of alternative choices. With respect to the 
theory of action, agent-based modeling is the domain of heuristics. Whatever 
mental or social shortcuts are assumed to be at work in the real world, we can 
design and study them by means of an agent-based computational model. 
Since the model is solved by simulation, that is to say by iterating the constitu-
tive rules of the model several times, mathematical tractability is no longer a 
constraint for the kind of actors that we want to represent. This is why some 
have argued that agent-based modeling is the right mathematics for social 
sciences (see Borrill and Tesfatsion, 2010).
Finally, agent-based modeling is all about social interactions. Every net-
work structure that we are able to imagine can be designed, and agents can be 
embedded within it so that their beliefs, desires, and opportunity can be seen 
as locally constrained and influenced by the choices of other agents and by the 
network’s topology.
For these reasons, agent-based modeling cannot be considered a “secondary 
technical detail”. This class of formal models makes it possible to design theo-
retical models as complex as we need them to be with respect to both action 
logic and structural / relational constraints affecting social actions. If we are 
really interested in the macroscopic consequences of a given set of hypothesized 
micro- and interaction-based mechanisms, agent-based modeling is the most 
powerful method available today for the rigorous study of every substantive 
problem in which aggregation matters. In the late 1980s, Coleman (1986, p. 
1316) complained about the existence of “extraordinarily elaborated methods 
for analysis of the behavior of a set of independent entities (most often indi-
viduals), with little development of methods for characterizing systemic action 
resulting from the interdependent actions of members of the system”. This 
lack of methods with which to study the micro-macro transition is in principle 
solved by the use of agent-based modeling.
The flexibility of this class of models may also have important consequences 
in resolving a fundamental difficulty with the analysis of social mechanisms. 
As remarked by Elster (2011), one constantly has to deal with the problem 
of indeterminacy: on the one hand, the indeterminacy of the conditions that 
trigger a given (set of) mechanism(s); on the other, the indeterminacy of the 
resulting effect of mechanisms operating at the same time but in opposite 
directions. In both cases, agent-based modeling constitutes a powerful virtual 
laboratory in which to design triggering conditions and to determine the resulting 
microscopic and macroscopic effects of concatenations of mechanisms.
Despite these objective advantages of agent-based modeling, to what extent 
might the importance that many analytical sociologists attribute to this method 
give rise to another form of “hard obscurantism” generating essentially only 
“science fiction” (I borrow the two terms from Elster’s (2007, p. 458-465) 
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criticism of quantitative social sciences)? My answer is that this danger can be 
limited by giving priority to the so-called empirically-calibrated agent-based 
models (see Hedström, 2005, ch. 6), that is to say, artificial societies in which 
agents’ attributes and behavior rules rely on empirical information provided 
by ethnographic studies, experiments, or survey data. Although not easy, 
this combination is technically possible. I do believe that analytical sociology 
should be given the chance to prove that this is a research pathway that is 
worth exploring.
Conclusion
I have discussed an article by Boudon which I regard as important for two rea-
sons. On the one hand, it is a synthetic exposition of his conception of rational 
action as “reason-based action”; on the other, it is also Boudon’s first direct 
assessment of the growing intellectual movement labeled “analytical sociology”.
As regards the former aspect, I first pointed out that Boudon’s conception 
of rational action is part of a more extensive shift from a narrow to a broad ver-
sion of rational action theory. To some extent, Boudon’s theory represents the 
extreme version of this trend, in that it equates rationality to the subjectively 
perceived reasons that an actor endorses to believe/do what he believes / does. 
In this respect, my argument has concerned the main problem that must be 
tackled when we assume that rational action amounts to “reason- grounded 
action”, i.e. the reduced capacity to figure out ex-ante facto a single micro- or 
macro-level outcome that should be observed under certain social circumstances. 
As Boudon honestly admits, the larger the set of acceptable reasons, the less 
unique are the theory’s predictions.
To solve this problem, I have suggested that, instead of going back to 
a narrower conception of rational action (as Abell [1992] suggested, for 
instance), we may try to accumulate regularities on “reason triggers”: that 
is to say, micro- or structural-level facts that increase the probability that 
specific sets of reasons will appear to actors’ minds. Among possible “reason 
triggers”, I have focused on “heuristics”, “social identity”, and “emotions”. 
In particular, I have stressed that the experimental evidence accumulated 
within the “fast-and-frugal heuristic” research program in cognitive psy-
chology shows systematic links among given informational structures, given 
beliefs, and certain mental shortcuts. Recent research in social psychology, 
political science, and economics on social identity conceived as a fundamen-
tal psychological need is of help in establishing regularities in the connec-
tion among social belonging, social identity and actors’ beliefs that increase 
our capacity to predict actors’ preference inconsistencies across social circles 
and over time. Social and cognitive psychology research on the positive, not 
necessarily distorting, role of emotions in belief formation can help in detecting 
regularities in actors’ systems of reason, in particular when interaction-based 
social comparisons are at the origin of emotions like envy, jealousy, indigna-
tion, shame, or resentment.
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In regard to Boudon’s critical stance on analytical sociology, I have sought 
to show that the basic principles of this approach are identical with Boudon’s 
conception of what scientific sociology should be. A minor disagreement con-
cerns the stress that some analytical sociologists put on the technical side of 
the enterprise. On this point, my argument has been that a specific class of 
formal models, namely agent-based computational simulations, is in fact one 
of the best resources available today for the study of theoretical models based 
on a complex form of methodological individualism. I have suggested that 
this conviction does not arise from a naïve love of technicalities, but rather 
from the close match between the theoretical requirements of this form of 
methodological individualism and the structural features of the computational 
methodology.
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